za controliranata imigracia

[KolioBalkanski]

edin priatel mi izprati otkas ot research paper koito moje da se stori interesen za niakoi ot posetitelite tuk:

Historically, groups have had cooperative jobs to do, such as hunting large prey or warring with other human groups for access to territory or mates. These jobs are too large for any one person, placing a premium on group coherence, communication and cooperation.

The trouble is that this also makes cheating more profitable. The evolutionary theorist William Hamilton23 argued that, to protect themselves, cooperative groups evolve strategies to make admission into their ranks difficult. These can take the form of being wary of outsiders, long periods of probation and costly (to the initiate) initiation ceremonies. This works to a degree, but cheats can still arise from within the group. Theorizing about group behaviour has therefore also emphasized the importance of genetic relatedness between group members. When it is high (as can be achieved if immigration is kept at a low level), altruistic and cooperative behaviours flourish because they tend to benefit one's own relatives. But genetic relatedness has its limitations. When it gets too high within a group, inbreeding begins to take its toll, and the benefits of sexual reproduction, namely the mixing and recombining of genes, are diminished.

Humans may have worked out a way to discard the need for relatedness as a means of ensuring cooperation: uniquely among the animals, humans may carry a set of behavioural adaptations specific to promoting cooperation and reciprocity, even when relatedness is low between group members24, 25. According to the doctrine known as strong reciprocity, humans are predisposed to cooperate with others, to make fair distribution of gains, and to punish those who fail to cooperate, even at a cost to themselves and with no expectation that these costs will be repaid24, 25.

This is a remarkable assertion, but should we believe it? Theoretical studies show that norms of cooperation and punishment of cheats can arise and be maintained in groups by a process of cultural 'group selection', in which more cohesive and cooperative groups outcompete groups riven by selfish cheats. Over time, these kinds of cooperative groups come to dominate. Laboratory experiments with volunteers and cross-cultural studies seem to support the strong-reciprocity view. There are implicit norms of cooperation in groups, and individuals seem willing to punish cheats altruistically — that is, the punisher pays the cost of punishing — even though all group members reap the benefits.

This extreme sociality can make cooperation a stable strategy resistant to cheating even when group members are not related. But it does depend upon one key demographic feature: migration between groups must be kept low. If it is not, groups become homogenized, cheats can prosper and the driving force of group selection — differences between groups — fails. Wariness of strangers, for all its potentially ugly manifestations, may be deep in our psychological make-up.